Outra conspiração para matar Hitler frustrada

Outra conspiração para matar Hitler frustrada


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Em 21 de março de 1943, o segundo plano de conspiração militar para assassinar Hitler em uma semana falha.

No verão de 1941, o major Henning von Tresckow, membro do Grupo de Exércitos do Gen. Fedor von Bock, foi o líder de uma das muitas conspirações contra Adolf Hitler. Junto com seu oficial de estado-maior, tenente Fabian von Schlabrendorff, e dois outros conspiradores, ambos de antigas famílias alemãs que também acreditavam que Hitler estava levando a Alemanha à humilhação, Tresckow planejava prender o Fuhrer quando visitou o quartel-general do Grupo de Exércitos em Borisov, em a União Soviética. Mas sua ingenuidade nessas questões tornou-se evidente quando Hitler apareceu - cercado por guarda-costas da SS e conduzido em um de uma frota de carros. Eles nunca chegaram perto dele.

Tresckow tentaria novamente em 13 de março de 1943, em um enredo chamado Operation Flash. Desta vez, Tresckow, Schlabrendorff, et al., Estavam estacionados em Smolensk, ainda na URSS. Hitler planejava voar de volta para Rastenburg, Alemanha, de Vinnitsa, na URSS. Uma escala foi planejada em Smolensk, durante a qual o Fuhrer deveria receber um pacote-bomba de um oficial inconsciente pensando que era um presente de bebida alcoólica para dois oficiais superiores em Rastenburg. Tudo correu conforme o planejado e o avião de Hitler decolou - a bomba estava programada para explodir em algum lugar sobre Minsk. Nesse ponto, co-conspiradores em Berlim estavam prontos para assumir o controle do governo central com a menção da palavra de código "Flash". Infelizmente, a bomba nunca explodiu porque o detonador estava com defeito.

Uma semana depois, em 21 de março, no Dia do Memorial dos Heróis, (um feriado em homenagem aos mortos alemães na Primeira Guerra Mundial), Tresckow selecionou o coronel Freiherr von Gersdorff para atuar como um homem-bomba no Museu Zeughaus em Berlim, onde Hitler deveria comparecer ao dedicação anual do memorial. Com uma bomba plantada em cada um dos bolsos de seu casaco, Gersdorff deveria se aproximar de Hitler enquanto ele revisava os memoriais e acendia as bombas, levando o ditador para fora - junto com ele mesmo e todos nas vizinhanças imediatas. Schlabrendorff forneceu bombas a Gersdorff - cada uma com um fusível de 10 minutos.

Uma vez no salão de exposições, Gersdorff foi informado de que o Fuhrer deveria inspecionar as exibições por apenas oito minutos - tempo insuficiente para que os fusíveis derretessem.

LEIA MAIS: O enredo de julho: quando as elites alemãs tentaram matar Hitler


Outra conspiração para matar Hitler frustrada - 21 de março de 1943 - HISTORY.com

SP5 Mark Kuzinski

Neste dia, o segundo plano de conspiração militar para assassinar Hitler em uma semana não sai.

No verão de 1941, o major-general Henning von Tresckow, membro do Centro do Grupo de Exércitos do general Fedor von Bock, foi o líder de uma das muitas conspirações contra Adolf Hitler. Junto com seu oficial de estado-maior, tenente Fabian von Schlabrendorff, e dois outros conspiradores, ambos de velhas famílias alemãs que também acreditavam que Hitler estava levando a Alemanha à humilhação, Tresckow planejava prender o Fuhrer quando visitasse o quartel-general do Grupo de Exércitos em Borisov, em a União Soviética. Mas sua ingenuidade nessas questões tornou-se evidente quando Hitler apareceu - cercado por guarda-costas da SS e conduzido em um de uma frota de carros. Eles nunca chegaram perto dele.

Tresckow tentaria novamente em 13 de março de 1943, em um enredo chamado Operation Flash. Desta vez, Tresckow, Schlabrendorff, et al., Estavam estacionados em Smolensk, ainda na URSS. Hitler planejava voar de volta para Rastenburg, Alemanha, de Vinnitsa, na URSS. Uma escala foi planejada em Smolensk, durante a qual o Fuhrer deveria receber um pacote-bomba de um oficial inconsciente pensando que era um presente de bebida alcoólica para dois oficiais superiores em Rastenburg. Tudo correu de acordo com o plano e o avião de Hitler decolou - a bomba estava programada para explodir em algum lugar sobre Minsk. Nesse ponto, co-conspiradores em Berlim estavam prontos para assumir o controle do governo central com a menção da palavra de código "Flash". Infelizmente, a bomba nunca explodiu - o detonador estava com defeito.

Uma semana depois, em 21 de março, no Dia do Memorial dos Heróis, (um feriado em homenagem aos mortos alemães na Primeira Guerra Mundial), Tresckow selecionou o coronel Freiherr von Gersdorff para atuar como um homem-bomba no Museu Zeughaus em Berlim, onde Hitler deveria comparecer ao dedicação anual do memorial. Com uma bomba plantada em cada um dos bolsos de seu casaco, Gersdorff deveria se aproximar de Hitler enquanto ele revisava os memoriais e acendia as bombas, levando o ditador para fora - junto com ele mesmo e todos nas vizinhanças imediatas. Schlabrendorff forneceu bombas a Gersdorff - cada uma com um fusível de 10 minutos.


Filme alemão conta a história verídica de uma trama que quase matou Hitler

E se Hitler tivesse sido assassinado logo depois que seus exércitos invadiram a Polônia para iniciar a Segunda Guerra Mundial? Como teria sido a história global - e judaica?

A pergunta não é respondida diretamente no filme alemão “13 minutos”. Mas o filme, baseado em um enredo real de lobo solitário para matar Hitler que quase teve sucesso, é um thriller clássico, colocando um homem contra o sistema, e uma exploração de como circunstâncias mínimas podem afetar o destino de milhões.

“13 Minutes” é dirigido por Oliver Hirschbiegel, que talvez seja mais conhecido por seu remake de 2007 de “Invasion of the Body Snatchers” com Nicole Kidman e Daniel Craig, bem como “The Downfall”, que recriou os últimos dias de Hitler em um bunker de Berlim.

O filme estreia em 7 de julho na Bay Area.

No centro da trama do filme está Georg Elsner (interpretado por Christian Friedel), um carpinteiro e funileiro de 35 anos de uma pequena vila da Suábia que tocava na banda da cidade e era popular entre as garotas locais. Ele é um simpatizante comunista - mas não um membro do partido - que observa com preocupação crescente como sua aldeia gradualmente se transformou durante os primeiros anos do regime nazista.

Elser vê uma conhecida que é forçada a se sentar na rua - cercada por camisas pardas e habitantes da cidade - com uma placa no pescoço que diz: "Na aldeia, sou a maior suína e consorte apenas de judeus". Ele assiste à exibição de um filme de propaganda no qual Hitler proclama que, sob seu governo, todo alemão terá um rádio, então um luxo, e as estradas esburacadas da vila serão pavimentadas e iluminadas.

Em um momento em que estadistas e analistas "especialistas" afirmavam que Hitler representava uma aberração temporária ou poderia ser apaziguado, Elser se convence de que o Führer mergulhará a Alemanha na guerra - e que se ninguém mais impedir o ditador nazista, ele deve fazer o trabalho ele mesmo.

Elser sabia que Hitler se dirigia a seus seguidores na maior cervejaria de Munique todo 8 de novembro, data de seu golpe de Estado de 1923 para tomar o poder na cidade bávara como base para derrubar a República de Weimar.

Então, a partir do final de 1938, ele visitou repetidamente a cervejaria, tomando medidas cuidadosas das colunas que ladeavam o pódio do alto-falante. Elser conseguiu um emprego em uma fábrica de armamentos e contrabandeou explosivos, dinamite e detonadores.

À medida que o dia 8 de novembro se aproximava, Elser trabalhava noite após noite de joelhos, segurando uma lanterna na boca, para inserir a bomba caseira em uma coluna. Ele conectou a bomba a dois relógios programados para disparar durante o discurso tipicamente longo de Hitler.

Na noite do aniversário do golpe, Elser pegou um trem para a fronteira com a Suíça para aguardar a notícia da morte de Hitler. Em vez disso, no entanto, ele soube que o Führer havia abreviado inesperadamente seu discurso.

Exatamente 13 minutos depois que Hitler deixou o pódio, a bomba explodiu no local exato onde Hitler estivera. A explosão matou sete oficiais nazistas e, para o pesar de Elser, uma garçonete inocente.

Enquanto Elser tentava cruzar a fronteira para a Suíça, algo em seu comportamento despertou a suspeita de um guarda de fronteira alemão, que prendeu Elser e o mandou, sob guarda, para uma prisão da Gestapo em Berlim.

Hitler estava convencido de que Elser era apenas uma ferramenta em uma vasta conspiração orquestrada pelo primeiro-ministro britânico Winston Churchill e exigiu que Elser fosse torturado até que revelasse os mentores por trás da tentativa de assassinato. Mas mesmo sob a tortura mais brutal, Elser recusou-se a fornecer até mesmo seu nome e data de nascimento. Só depois que a Gestapo arrasta seu amante de longa data, que está grávida de seu filho, ele reconhece a trama, tendo ele mesmo como o único autor.

Ninguém acreditou na história de Elser, mas em vez de ser executado no local, ele foi enviado para vários campos de concentração, terminando em Dachau.

Em abril de 1945, no entanto, quando o sonho de Hitler de um Reich de 1.000 anos desabou, o Führer se lembrou de Elser - e ordenou que ele fosse executado com um tiro de pistola no pescoço. Duas semanas depois que Elser foi morto, as tropas dos EUA libertaram Dachau.

“13 Minutes”, lançado na Alemanha em 2015 com o título “Elser - Ele teria mudado o mundo”, foi bem recebido pela crítica alemã e pelo público, embora tenha pontuação baixa no Metacritic.com.

A influente revista Der Spiegel observou que, por causa do filme, Elser foi reconhecido como “um verdadeiro herói alemão” após ter sido amplamente ignorado pelos historiadores.


Enredo de Henning von Tresckow

Em março de 1943, Henning von Tresckow e o parceiro Fabian von Schlabrendorff traçaram um plano semelhante, com explosivos plásticos. Hitler deveria visitar o posto de Tresckow em Smolensk no dia 13. O suposto assassino pediu a um dos membros da equipe de Hitler que agarrasse um pacote com duas garrafas de bebida alcoólica. O que realmente estava lá? Explosivos, conectados a um fusível de 30 minutos. O plano falhou, porém, quando os dois médios souberam que a bomba não explodiu, descobriu-se que era um fusível com defeito.


Oito tentativas malsucedidas mais notáveis ​​de matar Hitler

O filme de Tom Cruise de 2008 & # 8220Valkrie & # 8221 conta a história de como um grupo militar conspiratório liderado pelo coronel Claus von Stauffenberg planejava assassinar o ditador e fascista alemão Adolf Hitler. Esta tentativa não foi a primeira conspiração para matar Hitler. Aqui estão alguns dos enredos mais notáveis.

O filme de Tom Cruise de 2008 & # 8220Valkrie & # 8221 conta a história de como um grupo conspiratório militar liderado pelo coronel Claus von Stauffenberg planejava assassinar o ditador e fascista alemão Adolf Hitler. Essa tentativa não foi a primeira conspiração para matar Hitler. De acordo com a National Geographic, foram descobertos 42 planos para matar Hitler e nenhum teve sucesso. Aqui estão alguns dos enredos mais notáveis.

Maurice Bavaud (Munique, 9 de novembro de 1938)


Sendo um cidadão suíço romano chatólico e tendo frequentado o Seminário Saint Ilan na Bretanha, França, Bavaud acreditava que Hitler era um fio condutor para a humanidade e, mais importante, para a Igreja Chatólica na Suíça e na Alemanha. Bavaud ficou obcecado com a ideia de matar Hitler e planejou fazer o assassinato ele mesmo.

Bavaud planejava atirar em Hitler durante uma passeata chamada “Reichskristallnactht” na cidade de Munique em 9 de novembro de 1938. Fazendo-se passar por um repórter suíço, Bavaud conseguiu um lugar VIP. Inesperadamente, Hitler mudou sua posição de marcha para o final da rua, em vez de no meio. Bavaud tentou puxar a arma de dentro do bolso, mas quando Hitler passou por ele, todo o espectador estendeu os braços para a saudação de Hittler, impedindo Bavaud de dar o tiro. Mas mesmo se ele tivesse atirado, teria falhado de qualquer maneira, já que a distância entre ele e Hitler era grande demais para tornar o tiro mortal.

Após sua primeira falha, Bavaud tentou seguir o movimento de Hittler para se aproximar o suficiente dele. Suas tentativas nunca tiveram sucesso. Por fim, ficou sem dinheiro e fez uma viagem de trem para Paris sem comprar passagem. O condutor o entregou à polícia. Após a descoberta da arma entre os pertences de Bavaud, a polícia o entregou à Gestapo. O governo suíço não fez nada para salvá-lo. Em 14 de maio de 1941, Bavaud foi decapitado por guilhotina.

Georg Elser, (Burberbraukeller, Munique, 8 de novembro de 1939)

Elser era um cidadão alemão que temia que Hitler trouxesse devastação para a Alemanha. Ele não tinha motivos religiosos, em vez disso, ele se preocupava principalmente com questões trabalhistas. Elser desprezava a liberdade restrita do trabalhador, as más condições de trabalho e os baixos salários. Sua habilidade como carpinteiro e experiência anterior de trabalho em uma fábrica de relógios lhe deram a habilidade de construir uma bomba-relógio de madeira.

Elser planejava assassinar Hitler ao fazer um discurso anual em Burberbraukeller, uma grande cervejaria em Munique, que era um dos locais de reunião do Partido Nazista. Elser teve essa ideia quando estava participando da reunião nazista de 1938 naquele lugar e observou que o evento era mal guardado. Em novembro de 1938, Elser veio a Munique e conseguiu ficar dentro de Burberbraukeller. Todas as noites ele se arrastava para um espaço vazio atrás de uma coluna onde Hitler faria seu discurso. Sua bomba foi feita com muito cuidado. Até hoje ainda é considerada uma obra de arte. Em 5 de novembro de 1939, a bomba de 50 kg foi completamente instalada. Elser colocou a bomba para explodir às 21h20 de 8 de novembro de 1839.

Inesperadamente, no último momento, Hitler decidiu pegar o trem noturno para voltar a Berlim, pois o aeroporto de Munique estava fechado devido ao mau tempo. Consequentemente, ele teve que terminar seu discurso às 21h07. Treze minutos antes do previsto. Exatamente às 21h20, a bomba explodiu, matando 8 pessoas e ferindo mais de 60 outras. O plano de assassinato de Elser, que teria mudado a história, falhou. No momento da explosão, Elser já estava a caminho da Suíça. Ele foi preso pela polícia ao tentar cruzar a fronteira. Elser foi transferido para Munique e interrogado pela Gestapo. Ele finalmente confessou. Ele foi morto a tiros em 1945, apenas três semanas antes do fim da guerra no campo de concentração de Dachau.

Exército Polonês (Varsóvia, 5 de outubro de 1939)

Em setembro de 1939, as tropas de Hitler invadiram a Polônia. O exército polonês, no entanto, conseguiu continuar sua atividade clandestina durante a guerra. O exército subterrâneo planejava assassinar Hitler durante um desfile da Vitória em Varsóvia, plantando uma bomba na Praça Charles de Gaulles. A bomba não explodiu.

Inteligência soviética (anos 1940)

O soviete recrutou Olga Checkova, uma atriz russa que fugiu para Berlim e foi reconhecida como espiã. Checkova foi recrutada devido ao seu bom relacionamento com Hitler. A inteligência soviética pediu a Checkova que apresentasse Hitler a dois assassinos. O plano foi abandonado quando o russo começou a ganhar a guerra.

Operação Foxley (1944)

O governo britânico, por meio de seu Special Operation Executive (SOE), também planejou assassinar Hitler. A SOE planejou primeiro colocar bombas no trem em que Hitler viajava. Este plano foi abandonado porque a programação do trem de Hitler nunca foi previsível e muito irregular. O segundo plano era envenenar a comida e bebida de Hitler enquanto ele estava viajando de trem. Mais uma vez, esse plano foi abandonado porque a SOE exigiria um homem de dentro. O terceiro plano considerado o mais aceitável era designar um atirador para atirar em Hitler.

De um prisioneiro de guerra que fazia parte da guarda de segurança de Hitler, a SOE obteve informações sobre as atividades de Hitler em Berghof, um local profissional regularmente visitado por Hitler. Foi revelado que às 10 da manhã todos os dias, Hitler faria sua caminhada particular ao redor da floresta, desprotegido e fora da vista dos postos de sentinela. Uma bandeira nazista visível de um café próximo era hasteada toda vez que Hitler estava lá. A SOE planejou enviar 2 homens vestindo um uniforme alemão de pára-quedas na área ao redor do complexo.

Embora Churhill apoiasse o plano, nem todos os executivos da SOE o apoiaram. Muitos ainda acreditavam que, com a guerra quase acabada, não seria uma boa ideia assassinar Hitler. Matar Hitler o tornaria uma espécie de mártir para alguns alemães e o nazismo provavelmente sobreviveria. Nenhuma decisão foi alcançada e o plano nunca foi executado.

Henning Von Tresckow (1941 - 1944)

Tresckow veio de uma família nobre prussiana com longa tradição militar. Ele não gostou da crueldade demonstrada pelo regime de Hitler, em particular, quando Hitler começou o tiroteio em massa contra mulheres e crianças judias. Tresckow fez várias tentativas de matar Hitler de 1941 a 1944.

Em agosto de 1941, Tresckow e seu primo Schlabrendroff planejaram sequestrar Hitler quando viajavam para Heeresgruppe Mitte. O plano falhou por causa da alta segurança. Em março de 1943, Tresckow escondeu uma bomba de plástico em um pacote que supostamente continha garrafas de conhaque e tentou colocá-la no avião Condor de Hitler. A bomba não explodiu porque o compartimento de bagagem onde o pacote estava localizado não foi aquecido. A baixa temperatura impediu que a bomba detonasse. Schlabrendroff recuperou o pacote do avião para evitar a descoberta do enredo. Uma semana depois dessa conspiração fracassada, Tresckow fez outra tentativa de explodir Hitler. Desta vez, a execução do plano estava nas mãos de Gersdorff, amigo e aliado de Tresckow.

Rudolf von Gersdorff (março de 1943)

Gersdorff pretendia fazer um atentado suicida. Ele carregava uma bomba C2 de 8 onças e a escondia no bolso. Ele era um guia turístico quando Hitler visitou o Zeughaus Berlin para inspecionar as armas soviéticas capturadas. Seu plano era se jogar em torno de Hitler depois que Hitler fizesse seu discurso e explodisse a bomba que certamente mataria os dois. A bomba foi programada para explodir dentro de 10 minutos após o detonador ser ativado. Inesperadamente, Hitler encerrou a turnê antes do esperado. Provavelmente porque sentiu a ansiedade de Gersdorff. Gersdorff conseguiu difundir a bomba em um banheiro público. Ele evitou suspeitas e se tornou um dos poucos conspiradores militares alemães anti-Hitler que sobreviveram à guerra.

Claus Von Stauffenberg (20 de julho de 1944)

Fonte da imagem: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Henning_von_Tresckow
Nascido em uma família aristocrata católica, Stauffenberg se sentiu incomodado com os maus tratos de Hitler aos judeus. Finalmente, seu senso pessoal de justiça e moralidade religiosa o fez se voltar contra Hitler.

Stauffenberg chamou seu plano de assassinato de “Operação Valkrie”. Este é talvez o plano mais famoso para matar Hitler. Stauffenberg planejava esconder duas bombas em uma maleta e colocá-la na sala de instruções em Wolfsschanze, um dos quartéis-generais do nazismo, quando Hitler se reuniu lá em 20 de julho de 1944. Porque não havia tempo suficiente para armar a segunda bomba antes do início da reunião , apenas uma bomba foi carregada com sucesso para a sala de instruções. Stauffenberg colocou a pasta o mais perto possível de Hittler e pediu licença apressadamente. Inesperadamente, após sua saída da sala, o coronel Brandt afastou a pasta de sua posição pretendida.

A bomba explodiu. Stauffenberg observou a explosão e se convenceu de que ninguém poderia ter sobrevivido à explosão. Ele estava errado. Ele estava em Berlim para iniciar um golpe militar contra os líderes nazistas quando ouviu a notícia de que Hitler sofreu apenas ferimentos leves. Cientista acredita que a existência de janelas nas paredes da sala de reuniões reduziu o poder de explosão. Além disso, o posicionamento incorreto da bomba fez com que uma pesada e sólida mesa de conferência de carvalho formasse um escudo que protegia Hitler. A simulação de computador moderna mostra que, se apenas a segunda bomba também fosse usada, a explosão teria matado Hitler. Stauffenberg foi morto a tiros.

Além da tentativa acima, ainda existem inúmeras tramas para matar Hitler, de bombardeio a envenenamento. Embora todos tenham falhado, isso mostra ao mundo que nem todos os cidadãos alemães ou seus militares apoiaram a conduta e a ideologia de Hitler.


No início dos anos 1970, Karl Wolff, ex-Supremo SS e líder da polícia na Itália, promoveu a teoria de um suposto complô. A maioria das outras alegações de tal conspiração são baseadas em um documento de 1972 escrito por Wolff que Avvenire d'Italia publicado em 1991, e em entrevistas pessoais com Wolff antes de sua morte em 1984. Wolff sustentou que em 13 de setembro de 1943, Hitler deu a ordem de "ocupar a Cidade do Vaticano, proteger seus arquivos e tesouros de arte e levar o Papa e a Cúria para o norte " Hitler alegadamente não queria que o Papa "caísse nas mãos dos Aliados". [1] A confiabilidade de Wolff foi questionada por historiadores do Holocausto, [2] como István Deák, professor de história na Universidade de Columbia. [3] Revisão Uma missão especial por Dan Kurzman, um promotor da teoria, Deák observou a "credulidade" de Kurzman e que este "aceita sem crítica a validade de documentos controversos e acredita sem questionar nas declarações feitas a ele por seu principal interlocutor alemão, o ex-general SS Karl Wolff" . Ele ainda criticou a "documentação modesta" do livro, contendo "um grande número de referências vagas ou imprecisas". [4]

Antigo Generalmajor Erwin von Lahousen, em seu depoimento nos Julgamentos de Nuremberg em 1 de fevereiro de 1946 (Testemunho Warnreise 1330-1430), disse que Hitler ordenou que o Reichssicherheitshauptamt planejasse um complô para punir o povo italiano sequestrando ou assassinando Pio XII e o Rei de Itália. [5] Mas, disse Lahousen, o almirante Wilhelm Canaris, chefe do serviço de contra-espionagem alemão, informou seu homólogo italiano, general Cesare Amè, durante uma reunião secreta em Veneza em 29-30 de julho de 1943. Lahousen e o coronel Wessel Freytag von Loringhoven foram também presentes nesta reunião. De acordo com Lahousen, Amè aparentemente espalhou a notícia e a trama foi abandonada. [5]

Rudolf Rahn, plenipotenciário alemão da República Social Italiana (RSI), enviou uma carta a Robert A. Graham (um dos editores da ADSS) na década de 1970, publicada pela revista italiana 30 Giorni em 1991, afirmando que tal conspiração existia, mas que todos os documentos relacionados a ela haviam sido destruídos ou perdidos, Rahn morreu em 1975. [6]

John Cornwell Editar

John Cornwell's Papa de Hitler (1999) concorda com a existência de tal trama. [7] A única fonte que o relato de Cornwell cita é "Teste manuscrito, 822ff, sob a guarda da Cúria Jesuíta no Borgo Santo Spirito em Roma. "[8] A versão de Cornwell centra-se em Wolff, mas - ao contrário do relato de outros autores secundários - não afirma que o assunto não foi colocado na verdade, Cornwell afirma que Wolff "enviou cerca de seis a oito relatórios pessoais." [9] Como no próprio relato de Wolff, Cornwell considera Wolff o herói, cujo "propósito" era "impedir a deportação do Papa. "[9] De acordo com Cornwell, Wolff foi capaz de persuadir Hitler a desistir do plano. [10] Na opinião de Cornwell:" todos os fatos indicam, portanto, que uma tentativa de invadir o Vaticano e suas propriedades, ou apreender o Papa em resposta a um protesto papal teria prejudicado seriamente o esforço de guerra nazista. E assim mesmo Hitler veio a reconhecer o que Pacelli parecia ignorar: que a força social e política mais forte na Itália no outono de 1943 era a Igreja Católica, e que seu escopo para descumprimento com ruptura era imenso. "[11]

O valor histórico de Cornwell Papa de Hitler foi questionado em relação ao seu tratamento do Papa por muitos outros autores, como Kenneth L. Woodward, que escreveu em sua resenha do livro em 27 de setembro de 1999, edição de Newsweek que “Erros de fato e ignorância do contexto aparecem em quase todas as páginas”. Dr.Peter Gumpel, SJ, um especialista no período de guerra do papado do Papa Pio XII, publicou uma refutação ponto a ponto, incluindo apontando que "Antes da publicação do livro [" Papa de Hitler "], um artigo apareceu no O Sunday Times, no qual Cornwell (que não tem nenhum diploma acadêmico em história, direito ou teologia) disse que foi a primeira e única pessoa a receber permissão para visitar o arquivo da Secretaria de Estado do Vaticano, trabalhou lá por meses em final, e descobriu uma carta desconhecida e altamente comprometedora escrita por Pacelli em 18 de abril de 1917, que, segundo ele, estava ali escondida como uma bomba-relógio. Todas essas declarações são falsas e foram declaradas como tal em um documento oficial e autorizado declaração emitida pelo Vaticano em l'Osservatore Romano em 13 de outubro. " [12] Outro estudioso que abordou a publicação de Cornwell foi o Prof. Ronald Rychlak, com "Hitler, a Guerra e o Papa" e depois "A Guerra de Pio: Respostas aos Críticos de Pio XII", uma antologia importante. Além disso, o Rabino David Dalin escreveu "O Mito do Papa de Hitler".

Dan Kurzman Editar

Dan Kurzman, ex-correspondente estrangeiro da The Washington Post '', mantém em Uma missão especial: o plano secreto de Hitler para tomar o Vaticano e sequestrar o Papa Pio XII (2007) que o sequestro planejado foi real e que as entrevistas que realizou "não deixam dúvidas de que a trama era séria". [13] O livro de Kurzman recebeu atenção de fontes de notícias católicas e outras cristãs e de organizações de defesa. [14] [15]

Kurzman reconhece que não há documentos oficiais alemães que se referem ao complô, alegando que Hitler proibiu que o complô fosse escrito e baseia seu livro em entrevistas pessoais com alemães e autoridades do Vaticano. [13] A principal fonte de Kurzman é Karl Wolff, após sua libertação da custódia dos Aliados, Kurzman reconhece que Wolff foi comprovadamente mentiroso em muitos aspectos de seu depoimento. [16] Os outros entrevistados de Kurzman incluem: Rudolph Rahn, embaixador alemão no RSI, Eitel Mollhausen, o adjunto de Rahn, Albrecht von Kessel, o adjunto de Ernst von Weizsäcker, o coronel da SS Eugen Dollman, o contato de Wolff com o marechal de campo Albert Kesselring e Peter Gumpel , o defensor do Vaticano para a canonização de Pio XII. [16] Gumpel afirmou que Pio XII fez planos para renunciar no caso de seu sequestro. [17]

Owen Chadwick Editar

Owen Chadwick, um professor de história em Cambridge, depois de estudar os papéis de D'Arcy Osborne, o embaixador britânico no Vaticano durante a guerra, argumentou que o British Political Warfare Executive (PWE) "considerou uma excelente propaganda colocar isso Hitler estava prestes a sequestrar o Papa ”. [18] O escritório de propaganda britânico fabricou pelo menos duas transmissões sem fio alemãs em apoio à teoria, com base em um "boato" pré-existente. [18] Primeiro, em 9 de outubro de 1943, os britânicos divulgaram uma transmissão falsa em alemão alegando que todos os preparativos haviam sido feitos para tal sequestro. [18] Então, dois dias depois, outra transmissão falsificada afirmou que o Castelo de Lichtenstein em Württemberg estava pronto para prender o papa e os cardeais. [18]

O próprio Osborne considerou as chances de tal sequestro incrivelmente improváveis, já que a presença do Papa no Vaticano impediu os britânicos de bombardear o principal centro de comunicações do exército alemão no sul da Itália, que era adjacente. [19] Weizsäcker, o embaixador alemão, já havia garantido que o próprio Vaticano não seria ocupado pelos alemães quando eles ocupassem Roma após o colapso do governo de Mussolini. [20]

Alvarez e Graham Editar

David Alvarez e Robert A. Graham, um dos padres-historiadores jesuítas escolhido pelo Papa Paulo VI para editar o ADSS, concordam com Chadwick, concluindo que "as evidências relativas a um suposto complô para sequestrar o papa são, na melhor das hipóteses, mistas". [21] Observando que tal sequestro teria ultrajado os católicos em todo o mundo e desestabilizado seriamente a ocupação do Terceiro Reich de nações de maioria católica, Alvarez e Graham argumentam que os propagandistas aliados "não se esquivaram da oportunidade" de reivindicar tal conspiração. [21]

Alvarez e Graham citam as fabricações do PWE mencionadas por Chadwick, mas também peças de propaganda anteriores do PWE apresentando várias afirmações sobre o Papa contemplando abandonar o Vaticano devido às ameaças do Eixo. [21] Embora tais rumores tenham sido recolhidos até mesmo por diplomatas alemães, Alvarez e Graham concluem que "a trilha mais clara no emaranhado de rumor, memória e ficção que cerca o suposto plano para sequestrar o Papa é aquela que leva de volta a Londres em vez de Berlim ". [22] Alvarez e Graham vão além ao indiciar a bolsa de estudos daqueles que reivindicam um complô:

Os historiadores ainda não descobriram uma única evidência contemporânea indicando que Hitler, Himmler, Bormann ou qualquer outra autoridade tinha qualquer intenção séria, quanto mais um plano, de invadir a Cidade do Vaticano e executar o Papa Pio XII. Quanto a toda a fumaça, as lembranças são do pós-guerra e, de forma suspeita, egoísta aos rumores e advertências de segunda e terceira mão sobre os supostos planos e concentração de forças indocumentadas. As poucas evidências confiáveis ​​que existem sugerem que, de fato, não havia nenhum plano de ação contra o Papa. [23]


A história interna de como um plano nazista para sabotar o esforço de guerra dos EUA foi frustrado

o New York Times a manchete de 4 de julho de 1942 foi quase exultante, um presente do Dia da Independência para um país no meio da guerra: & # 8220 Sabotadores da Nazi enfrentam a Justiça do Exército Stern. & # 8221 O artigo descreveu uma conspiração frustrada e um FBI que estava vigilante contra ameaças para a segurança pública. Incluía um desenho de J. Edgar Hoover em um importante telefonema.

O artigo também foi assustador. Oito agentes da Alemanha nazista estavam sob custódia, pegos em solo americano com planos detalhados para sabotar a infraestrutura principal e espalhar o pânico. No final de junho, dois esquadrões de sabotadores alemães desembarcaram em praias americanas, transportados por submarinos para Long Island e para a costa da Flórida. Os sabotadores tinham explosivos suficientes para dois anos de destruição, com planos imediatos para explodir uma ponte ferroviária crítica, interromper o abastecimento de água de Nova York e espalhar o terror. Eles foram parados a tempo.

A realidade era ainda mais assustadora do que o Vezes relatado, e notavelmente diferente da história apresentada pelo FBI: um sistema de defesa pego de surpresa, conspiradores que eram meramente humanos e uma confissão quase estragada pela agência.

Embora Hoover e seu FBI pintassem as prisões como um grande golpe, na verdade foi o mero acaso que trouxe o complô nazista à tona.

Isso não quer dizer que a equipe de Hoover não estava procurando nazistas. O FBI estava alerta aos esquemas em solo dos EUA desde que o ataque a Pearl Harbor sacudiu o sistema de defesa do país. A agência tinha até se infiltrado em um círculo de espiões nazistas baseados em Nova York e os prendido no ano anterior, em 1941. Esse círculo era liderado por um homem chamado Frederick & # 8220Fritz & # 8221 Duquesne, um sul-africano que morou em Nova York por mais de 30 anos. Com um negócio de fachada em Manhattan e encomendas de Berlim, Duquesne montou uma rede de operativos, incluindo um que obtinha informações sobre alvos marítimos e estava preparando uma bomba fusível. Outro plotter projetou usinas de energia para empresas de serviços públicos em Nova York. No outono de 1940, eles mapeavam alvos industriais no Nordeste. As prisões de Duquesne e seu anel em junho de 1941 foram um golpe publicitário para Hoover e um alerta para a nação.

O problema era que, depois de Pearl Harbor, o FBI estava procurando em muitas direções erradas por sabotadores, incluindo um esforço mal orientado de rede de arrasto contra famílias de imigrantes em ambas as costas.

Este novo lote de sabotadores, todos residentes de longa data nos EUA, foram treinados para sua missão na Alemanha em uma propriedade chamada Quentz Lake fora de Berlim. Os generais de Hitler e # 8217 vinham clamando por operações de sabotagem e essa pressão afetou Walter Kappe, um tenente do exército que morou em Chicago e Nova York na década de 1930 antes de retornar para servir ao Reich. Kappe began recruiting in 1941 from among other Germans who had also repatriated from America. Leading the group was the oldest, George Dasch, age 39, a long-time waiter in New York who had served in the U.S. Army. Others included Ernest Berger, who had gone so far as to obtain U.S. citizenship. Kappe’s plan was to send the team ahead to settle in before he arrived in Chicago to direct sabotage operations. They would be paid handsome salaries, be exempt from military service, and receive plum jobs after Germany won the war.

George Dasch, lead saboteur (Public Domain)

All the agents Kappe selected had lived in the United States for years – two had U.S. citizenship. Their training was rigorous and they practiced their fake identities, rehearsing every detail. There was even a built-in protocol to protect the operation from the temptation to defect, as William Breuer notes in Nazi Spies in America: “If any saboteur gave indications of weakening in resolve… the others were to ‘kill him without compunction.’”

Their operation was dubbed Pastorius, named for the founder of the first German settlement in America (Germantown, later absorbed into Philadelphia). The eight secret agents would sail in two groups from a submarine base in Lorient, France. The first group boarded the night of May 26 and U-201 submerged for the voyage. U-202 followed two nights later, less than six months after the U.S. and Germany declared war on each other.

On the beach of Long Island’s south fork on June 12, the night of the Pastorians’ arrival, was not the FBI but a young Coast Guard recruit named John Cullen, strolling the sands near Amagansett. Cullen was understandably stunned when he spotted four men in German uniforms unloading a raft on the beach. Cullen, 21, was unarmed. Wearing the fatigues was a tactical choice: If the men were captured in them, they would be treated as prisoners of war rather than spies subject to execution.

He rushed toward the group and called out for them to stop. Dasch went for the young man and grabbed his arm, managing to threaten and bribe him at the same time. Dasch shoved a wad of cash into Cullen’s hand, saying in clear English, “Take this and have a good time. Forget what you’ve seen here.” The young man raced off back in the direction of the Coast Guard station, while Dasch and his team quickly buried their uniforms and stash of explosives and detonators to retrieve later. When Cullen returned to the beach at daylight with several Coast Guard officers, they found footprints that led to the cache.

But the Germans had gotten away. At Amagansett they boarded a Long Island Railroad train into the city. Dasch bought four newspapers and four tickets, and the saboteurs blended into the Manhattan-bound commuters on the 6:57 a.m. train. When they reached the city they split into two groups: two agents checked into a hotel across from Penn Station, and the other two headed for a second hotel.

A few days later, on June 17, off the Florida coast just below Jacksonville, U-201 surfaced and deposited the second quartet of saboteurs before dawn. Following procedure, they buried their explosives and uniforms near the beach, walked to nearby Highway 1, and caught a Greyhound for Jacksonville. Within a day, two were bound for operations in Chicago, and the other two headed for Cincinnati. Their list of targets included the complex systems of canal locks in Cincinnati and St. Louis at the heart of commerce on the Mississippi and aluminum factories in Philadelphia.

Operation Pastorius appeared to be on track.

The New York plotters chose their targets for maximum suffering and symbolism. The Hell Gate Bridge carried four vital rail arteries – two for passengers, two for freight – across the most densely populated and economically important passage of the Northeast. The bridge was also an icon of American engineering. Other transportation targets were Newark Penn Station and the “Horseshoe Curve” on the Chesapeake & Ohio Railroad at Altoona, Pennsylvania. Another big target was the New York water supply, a gem of public utilities and health. The state’s Board of Water Supply, aware of the vulnerability, had boosted wartime security for the system to include 250 guards and more than 180 patrolmen.

Once the plotters confirmed logistics, they would retrieve their cache of explosives near Amagansett.

When Dasch checked into the hotel with fellow conspirator Berger, though, he used the moment to tell Berger that he planned to call the FBI and expose their scheme. He told Berger he could either join his planned defection or Dasch would kill him. Then Dasch made a phone call to the local FBI office.

He never wanted to return to Germany he thought if he turned the operation in, he could stay in America and perhaps resume his life. Dasch had originally stowed away on a freighter headed for the U.S., arriving in 1922. He and his Pennsylvanian wife both pined to stay in the States. If Dasch hadn’t given himself up, would they have been successful? The odds were in their favor.

Dasch told the FBI agent who answered that a Nazi submarine had just landed and he had important information. “I’ll be in Washington within the week to deliver it personally to J. Edgar Hoover,” he said, then hung up.

The FBI had received hundreds of many prank or misguided calls since the war started, and this seemed to be one more. But when the same office got a call from the Coast Guard about the Long Island episode and the stash of explosives retrieved on the beach, the FBI took the anonymous call seriously.

Dasch soon broke free from his team in New York, however, and boarded a train for Washington, D.C. He phoned FBI headquarters when he got there. “I’m the man who called your New York office,” he said. “I am in Room 351 at the Mayflower Hotel.” He asked to speak with Hoover. He was not put through.

For the next two days, dumbfounded FBI agents interrogated Dasch in his hotel room with a stenographer taking down his story: from the sabotage training outside Berlin to the targets identified by both teams, and contacts’ addresses in America. He also handed over all the cash the German government had provided to bankroll years of chaos: over $82,000. Within 14 days, all eight saboteurs were in jail, a string of arrests from New York to Chicago.

None of the infrastructure targets were hit. Public alarm, however, skyrocketed when the news broke. Roosevelt ordered a military tribunal, as the Vezes headline noted, the first time one had been called since Lincoln’s assassination. All eight defendants pled not guilty, saying they had volunteered for the operation only to get back to their families in America.

Photo from the military trial (Public Domain)

Hoover knew the only way to catch up was to manage the spin. He stage-managed the press details of the case, framing the captures as brilliant police work, when in fact Dasch had volunteered the names and addresses. In newsreels produced through the war, Hoover looked into the camera and addressed GIs overseas, assuring them that the FBI was their capable ally in the war to protect America.

Dasch hoped the risks he took to alert authorities to the scheme would get him clemency, but they were lost in accounts of a triumphant FBI. O & # 160Washington Post reported only that Dasch “cooperated with United States officials in procuring evidence against the others.”

That July even Hoover reportedly wavered on executing the man who handed the case to him on a platter. In the end, Attorney General Francis Biddle requested leniency for Dasch. The military tribunal found all eight guilty and sentenced them to death. Dasch’s sentence was reduced to 30 years in prison, and Berger’s sentence reduced to life.

On August 8, the six condemned to die were taken to the District of Columbia Jail and executed by electric chair. Prison officials were concerned about the power surge – the chair was relatively untested locally. Each execution took 14 minutes. News cameras filmed the ambulances bearing the bodies away afterward.

(UPDATE, June 26, 2017: The Washington Post recently reported that in 2006, the National Park Service uncovered a clandestine memorial to the six Nazi spies.)

After serving six years of their sentence, Dasch and Berger were released. Dasch’s lawyer repeatedly applied for his client’s amnesty, and by 1948 President Truman leaned toward a pardon. Still, Hoover argued against it. Dasch accepted deportation as a condition of pardon, and both prisoners were released and sent to what was then West Germany, where they were treated as pariahs. Dasch settled with his wife in a small town and started a small business, only to have news coverage expose him. They had to flee crowds threatening vigilante justice to the “traitor” and start over in another town. A friend told him, “It’s a good thing you weren’t there. They would have killed you.” Dasch later published a memoir laying out his side of the story, but it was mostly ignored.

Hoover made sure the FBI would not pay the price of the American public’s fears. That would be borne by immigrant families caught up in the national security dragnet that swept both coasts. Within a few months after Pearl Harbor, the FBI arrested 264 Italian-Americans, nearly 1,400 German-Americans and over 2,200 Japanese-Americans. Many were never shown evidence leading to their arrest. Beyond those initial arrests, however, came a much heavier cost. Throughout the war, approximately 100,000 Japanese-Americans were forced into internment camps, and 50,000 Italian-Americans were similarly relocated.


Op-Ed: How a network of citizen-spies foiled Nazi plots to exterminate Jews in 1930s L.A.

On July 26, 1933, a group of Nazis held their first public rally in Los Angeles. As Jewish groups in the city debated how they should respond to Adolf Hitler’s persecution of Jews in Europe, L.A.’s Nazis, many of them German emigres, gathered at a biergarten downtown, wearing brown shirts and red, white and black armbands with swastikas.

The Nazis belonged to a growing movement of white supremacists in L.A. that included many American brothers in hate: the Ku Klux Klan, a group of Hitler supporters known as the Silver Shirts, and a dozen like-minded organizations with vaguely patriotic names such as the American Nationalist Party, the Christian American Guard, and the National Protective Order of Gentiles.

Some weeks ago, white supremacists in Charlottesville, Va., chanted “Jews will not replace us.” Their predecessors were even less subtle: They called for “death to Jews.”

Unwilling to wait and see if any of them would act on their threats, Leon Lewis, a Jewish lawyer and World War I veteran who had helped found the Anti-Defamation League, decided to investigate the anti-Semitic hate groups. In August 1933, mere weeks after the rally, Lewis recruited four fellow World War I veterans, plus their wives, to go undercover and join every Nazi and fascist group in the city.

Leon Lewis understood that hate knows no national boundaries.

Lewis’ recruits did not know there would be another world war. And they certainly did not know a Holocaust would occur in Europe.

But once they had infiltrated the groups, they understood that they had to take the Nazi threat seriously. They repeatedly heard fellow Americans talk candidly about wanting to overthrow the government and kill every Jewish man, woman and child.

Lewis’ operatives were all Christian, save for one Jew. They regarded their mission as an American one. Their intention was to gather sufficient evidence of illegal activities by the groups, then turn it over to the appropriate government agencies, after which Lewis planned to return to practicing law. What Lewis did not anticipate is that local authorities would prove indifferent to — or supportive of — the Nazis and fascists.

Within weeks of going undercover, Lewis’ network of spies discovered a plot to wrest control of armories in San Francisco, L.A. and San Diego — part of a larger plan to take over local governments and carry out a mass execution of Jews. Lewis immediately informed L.A. Police Chief James Edgar “Two-Gun” Davis of the Nazi scheme to seize weapons and, as Lewis warned in a memo later, to “foster a fascist form of government in the United States.”

Lewis was shocked when Davis interrupted him to defend Hitler. The police chief, he noted in the memo, told him: “Germans could not compete economically with the Jews in Germany and had been forced to take the action they did.” The greatest danger the city faced, Davis insisted, was not from Nazis but from communists living in the heavily Jewish neighborhood of Boyle Heights. As far as Davis was concerned, every communist was a Jew and every Jew a communist.

Lewis got a similar response from the Sheriff’s Department and local FBI agents, many of whom were sympathetic to the Nazis and fascists. He decided he had to continue the operation, and his spies agreed.

From the summer of 1933 until 1945, while many Americans closed their eyes to the hate growing around them, Lewis’ spies and informants, who numbered close to two dozen at the height of operations, risked their lives to stop Hitler’s minions and alert citizens to the danger these groups posed.

They uncovered a series of Nazi plots. There was a plan to murder 24 Hollywood actors and power figures, including Al Jolson, Eddie Cantor, Louis B. Mayer, Samuel Goldwyn, Charlie Chaplin and James Cagney. There was a plan to drive through Boyle Heights and machine-gun as many Jewish residents as possible. There were plans for fumigating the homes of Jewish families with cyanide, and for blowing up military installations and seizing munitions from National Guard armories on the day Nazis intended to launch their American putsch.

These plans for murder and sabotage failed because Lewis’ operatives penetrated the inner circles of the hate groups and foiled them. Charles Slocombe, Lewis’ ace spy, thwarted two of the most deadly plots to kill Hollywood figures, one of them by turning Nazis and fascists against one another and raising fears that they might be arrested for murder due to leaks inside the German American Bund and Silver Shirts. Slocombe stopped a second mass murder plot by convincing three of the plotters that the mastermind behind the plan, the British fascist Leopold McLaglan, was about to betray them.

Knowing their inner circles had been infiltrated, but not by whom, and unwilling to risk prison, the groups postponed their plans. Permanentemente.

Without ever firing a gun, Lewis and his spies managed to defeat a variety of enemies. Only after Congress declared war on Germany did government authorities finally relieve Lewis — “the most dangerous Jew in Los Angeles,” as Nazis called him — of the burden of tracking down these dangerous elements. Nevertheless, he and his operatives continued to monitor the groups throughout the war years.

Leon Lewis understood that hate knows no national boundaries. Foreign-born Nazis and American-born Silver Shirts and Klansmen gladly joined together in targeting Jews and communists. And few Americans, either inside or outside the government, tried to stop them in those early years.

He and his network of spies understood the importance of vigilance. They refused to allow their city and country to be threatened by hate. With their actions they show us that when a democratic government fails to stop extremists bent on violence, citizens must protect one another, no matter their race or religion.

Steven J. Ross is a professor of history at USC and the author of “Hitler in Los Angeles: How Jews Foiled Nazi Plots Against Hollywood and America.”

Follow the Opinion section on Twitter @latimesopinion or Facebook


When the Nazis Tried to Exterminate Hollywood (Book Excerpt)

Decades before today’s white nationalist movement, "the most dangerous Jew in Los Angeles" fought a plan to assassinate film stars and studio heads by hanging them in the streets.

Steven J. Ross

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Thalberg and Jack Warner &mdash to a secret meeting at Hillcrest, the elite Jewish country club in Cheviot Hills. For nearly a year, Lewis had used a network of spies (including the son of a Bavarian general) to keep tabs on Nazis and American-born fascists in Los Angeles. Some in the group knew a bit about what Lewis had been up to, but few knew the full extent of his work. As the group settled into the Club Room after dinner, Lewis rose to share what he had learned: Anti-Semites had invaded their studios. Foremen sympathetic to the Nazi and fascist cause had fired so many below-the-line Jewish employees that many studios had “reached a condition of almost 100 percent [Aryan] purity.” Scarier still, Lewis told them his spies had uncovered death threats against the moguls.

He pleaded with them for money to continue his operations so they could keep track of not only how the Nazis were trying to influence the studios but also their plans for sabotage and murder in Southern California. Would the moguls help?

Thalberg promised $3,500 from MGM. Paramount production head Emanuel Cohen matched it. RKO’s David Selznick contributed and said he would canvass the town’s talent agents for additional contributions. By the end of the evening, the group had pledged $24,000 ($439,000 in 2017 dollars) for the spy operation.

Lewis was elated. The money would allow him to recruit more spies and continue his undercover operations. “For the first time,” he wrote an ADL colleague, “we have established a real basis of cooperation with the Motion Picture Industry, and I look for splendid results.”

Over the next decade, until the end of World War II, Lewis, whom the Nazis called “the most dangerous Jew in Los Angeles,” used the money raised from Hollywood to recruit World War I veterans &mdash and their wives and daughters &mdash to spy on Nazi and fascist groups in Los Angeles. Often rising to leadership positions, this daring group of men and women foiled a series of Nazi plots &mdash from hanging 24 Hollywood actors and power figures, including Al Jolson, Eddie Cantor, Charlie Chaplin, Mayer and Samuel Goldwyn, to blowing up defense installations on the day Nazis planned to launch their American putsch.

Even though Nazi plans for murder and sabotage failed, as with today, we need to take this homegrown extremism seriously. Lewis certainly did. While local and federal officials were busy monitoring the activities of communists, his operatives uncovered enough evidence of hatred and plotting to be concerned about the fate of Los Angeles Jews and American democracy. Were it not for Lewis and his spies, these plots might have succeeded.

As he paced his downtown office on Seventh Street waiting to meet his first potential recruit in late July 1933, Lewis reflected upon the events that had led him to embark on a new career as spy master. On the evening of July 26, 100 Hitlerites, many dressed in brown shirts and sporting red, white and black swastika armbands, held their first public meeting at their spacious downtown headquarters in the Alt Heidelberg building. Hans Winterhalder, handsome propaganda chief of the Friends of the New Germany, told the crowd of plans to unify the 50 scattered German-American organizations of Southern California and their 150,000 members into one body. It had been seven months since Adolf Hitler had become the Reich’s chancellor of Germany in January 1933 and five months since Berlin had sent Capt. Robert Pape to Los Angeles to build a Nazi organization in the area.

For Nazi propaganda minister Joseph Goebbels, no American city was more important than Los Angeles, home to what he deemed the world’s greatest propaganda machine, Hollywood. Although many people in the U.S. and around the globe viewed New York as the capital of Jewish America, Goebbels saw Hollywood as a far more dangerous place, one where Jews ruled over the motion picture industry and transmitted their ideas throughout the world. And Los Angeles seemed the perfect place to establish a beachhead for the Nazi assault on the U.S. Not only did Southern California have a long history of anti-Semitism and right-wing extremism, but the Los Angeles port also was less closely monitored than New York (or “Jew York,” as Nazis often referred to it), which made it easier to use as the central depot for sending spies, money and secret orders from Germany.

What really frightened Lewis was a small paragraph in a Los Angeles Record story about the rally describing how Los Angeles-based Nazis had turned the Alt Heidelberg basement into a barracks for unemployed Germans who would be fed, bathed and housed at no cost other than being instructed in National Socialism. Lewis understood that this was not done out of kindness. The Nazis were raising an army from among the unemployed and discontented, especially targeting veterans, just as Hitler had done in the 1920s to fuel his rise.

There was little in Lewis’ background to suggest that the modest Midwesterner, 6-foot-1 with light brown eyes and black hair, would come to this. After graduating from the University of Chicago Law School in 1913, Lewis, committed to the Jewish idea of tikun olam (world repair), became the ADL’s first national executive secretary. In 1923, after serving in World War I, he added the ADL’s international division to his portfolio, and keeping track of Hitler and the threat he posed to Jews became an obsession. Within days of the local Nazis’ first meeting, Lewis, convinced American authorities were too obsessed with communists to take the Nazi threat seriously, started his spy operation from his small downtown law office.

His initial recruits to his spy ring included an unlikely array of non-Jews. He wanted experienced soldiers (and their wives) who would not be prone to fear or exaggeration so government agencies could not accuse Lewis of engaging in Jewish paranoia. First to join was John Schmidt, the German-born son of a Bavarian general who had moved to the U.S. around 1903, joined the Army and been wounded in World War I. After Lewis appealed to his patriotism and promised the cash-strapped veteran a modest monthly stipend, Schmidt &mdash who operated under the code names Agent 11, 74 and Elf &mdash agreed to pose as a Nazi sympathizer, and his wife, Alice (Agent 17), joined him, becoming president of the FNG’s Ladies Auxiliary. Others followed, including Charles Slocombe, a former Long Beach KKK member who penetrated deep into the leadership ranks of the Klan and fascist groups like the anti-Semitic American National Party, Silver Shirts and the American Labor Party’s military wing, the Lode Star Legion. Lewis also enlisted Neal Ness, an engineer turned journalist turned spy who became the American right-hand man and confidant to FNG leader Herman Schwinn.

As millions of Americans prepared to welcome in the New Year on Dec. 31, 1935, Slocombe warned Lewis of an outrageous plot to assassinate a number of Hollywood’s leading figures. Ingram Hughes, a failed attorney and founder of the ANP, was working closely with local Nazi leader Schwinn to rid the nation of its “Jewish menace.” The 60-year-old fascist planned to assassinate 20 prominent Angelenos, including Busby Berkeley, Superior Court judge Henry M. Willis, entertainment lawyer Mendel Silberberg and Lewis himself. “Busby Berkeley will look good dangling on a rope’s end,” the ANP leader quipped. Hughes hoped the hangings would spark a nationwide uprising against Jews. He recruited Nazi propagandist Franz Ferenz (distributor of German films and newsreels on the West Coast), four Nazis from the FNG and several other trusted accomplices.

This was no hasty killing fantasy but a carefully planned terrorist plot. To hide their identities, he ordered the kidnappers to wear cotton gloves and heavy wool socks over their shoes. “Every man will have a perfect alibi,” Hughes explained, and “several weeks will be spent in developing the minutest details to the nth degree.” The police, Hughes’ friends on the force had assured him, “will not interfere but will give a sigh of relief.”

Lewis knew all this because Slocombe had penetrated the ANP. Lewis’ spy impressed Hughes at their first meeting when he insisted the KKK and Silver Shirts “were not militant enough” and that he “wanted to have action and not a lot of talk.” The 28-year-old Long Beach water-taxi driver soon became the fascist’s most valued assistant.

Hughes’ slaughtering of Jews did not proceed as planned. He and Schwinn suspected that Lewis’ spies had penetrated the operation they just did not know who was spying for the Jews and did not wish to risk being arrested for murder until the traitor was revealed. “We must watch our step as we proceed,” Hughes confided to Slocombe. Fearing Lewis’ reach, Hughes postponed the killings.

Another plot surfaced a year later, hatched by the British fascist Leopold McLaglan, the estranged brother of 1936 Oscar winner Victor McLaglen (Leopold changed the spelling to differentiate from his brother). The 53-year-old World War I veteran had turned to teaching martial arts to rich Californians and Nazis (he had once taught at Scotland Yard) after his brother blackballed him from acting. Schwinn’s crowd loved McLaglan not only had he built a fascist organization in England, but he was teaching Nazis and White Russians “how to kill through jiujitsu.” Soon after they met in September 1937 at the Nazi-run German Day Celebration (which attracted a crowd of 3,000), McLaglan invited Slocombe, longtime fascist Henry Allen and prominent Hollywood photographer and Silver Shirts leader Ken Alexander to dinner at his favorite restaurant, the House of Sullivan. Over Tom Collinses and scotch and sodas, McLaglan shared his “bloody good idea.” And bloody it was. To garner “worldwide publicity, we are going to have to do a wholesale slaughtering here in the city of plenty of the leading Jews.” He planned on targeting Jewish studio execs, the Hollywood Anti-Nazi League and the Christians who aided them. “I can get the Nazi boys and the White Russians who would do this for us,” he promised. White Russian leader George Doombadze, he added, has a “psycho” fellow “who does this stuff for him all the time.”

Slocombe sent Lewis 24 names on McLaglan’s killing list, which included some of the most famous people in the world, including Cantor, Chaplin, Goldwyn, Jolson, Jack Benny, James Cagney, Fredric March, Paul Muni, Joseph Schenck, B.P. Schulberg, Gloria Stuart, Sylvia Sidney, Donald Ogden Stewart, Walter Winchell and William Wyler. As they reviewed the hit list, McLaglan revealed he had spoken to FNG leader Schwinn about the assassination plot “many times.” Schwinn told McLaglan that his Nazi allies “were particularly interested in eliminating” the key leaders of the Anti-Nazi League.

Boasting that he “could get all the dynamite he needed through the police,” McLaglan would provide two dozen Nazi and Russian assassins with the bombs and the names and addresses of their targets, all of whom would be murdered on the same night. Knowing that they would likely fall under suspicion, McLaglan suggested they spend the night of the killings in Santa Barbara to have “a perfect alibi.”

The plot unraveled when Slocombe convinced Allen and Alexander that McLaglan planned a double-cross in which he would pin the murders on them. So they double-crossed first, striking a deal with District Attorney Buron Fitts: sworn statements implicating McLaglan in return for immunity. Evidence in hand, the police arrested McLaglan on Oct. 26, 1937 but instead of charging him with attempted murder, the D.A.’s office covered up police involvement in the murder plot by charging the British fascist only with extorting money from millionaire Philip Chancellor (who had hired McLaglan to conduct an undercover operation). When the trial began six weeks later, McLaglan, dressed in a dapper suit and sporting a monocle, pleaded not guilty, but a jury found him guilty of extortion. Sentenced to five years in prison, McLaglan received probation on the condition that he take the first ship back to England.

Having saved Hollywood Jews a second time, Lewis and his spies turned to getting Schwinn deported. In September 1938, armed with evidence provided by Lewis and Ness, the U.S. Department of Naturalization and Immigration began steps to revoke Schwinn’s citizenship. Nine months later, federal judge Ralph Jenny ruled that Schwinn had perjured himself by providing false information on his application for citizenship. Although Schwinn told the court he had made “an honest mistake,” the judge, insisting that the Nazi was not of “good moral character,” revoked his citizenship. Two hours later, Lewis’ informant Jimmy Frost gave him more good news: The immigration service had begun deportation proceedings against the Nazi.

Despite their success, Lewis and his spies never received the recognition they deserved. It was not until after Pearl Harbor that the communist-obsessed FBI acted against Nazi spies. In the days and weeks after the attack on Dec. 7, 1941, J. Edgar Hoover’s men received nationwide acclaim for the speed and efficiency with which they rounded up Axis spies and fifth columnists. Yet, as Lewis’ assistant Joseph Roos later noted, the Los Angeles FBI “had scant security information of their own.” Government intelligence agents simply retyped the list of suspected German agents and subversive fifth columnists sent by Lewis and claimed it as theirs. As far as the FBI was concerned, its job was done. On Oct. 3, 1942, the L.A. bureau filed what it believed was its last report on Schwinn: “As no further investigation is contemplated &hellip this case is being closed.”

The FBI may have closed its case on Schwinn and the Bund, but Lewis knew that the fifth-column movement remained alive and that hatred of Jews had grown stronger since Pearl Harbor. With the FBI focused on rounding up suspected foreign agents, it was up to him to expose any threats to the city’s Jewish community. Over the next several years, he relied on the mother-daughter spy team of Grace and Sylvia Comfort to keep tabs on &mdash and foil the plots of &mdash anti-Semites. One member of the California Women’s Republican Club told Sylvia Comfort that all Jews should be “hung from lampposts within five years,” while another complained, “that was too slow.” Knowing it would take only one crazy person to carry out these threats, Lewis and his operatives continued watching over the city with an eye to protecting Jews from Nazis and anti-Semites.

There are many ways to fight an enemy, not all of which require guns. The actions taken by Lewis and his allies require us to change the way we think about American Jewish resistance in the 1930s. From August 1933 until the end of World War II, with few resources at their disposal, Lewis and his courageous undercover operatives continually defeated a variety of enemies &mdash Nazis, fascists and fifth columnists &mdash bent on violence and murder. Without ever firing a weapon, they managed to keep Los Angeles and its citizens safe.

Lewis and the men and women who aided him were heroes who never sought glory. He died of a heart attack at age 65 in 1954 mostly unrecognized, except by a few, and what happened faded from memory.

In the wake of recent events in Charlottesville, Virginia, and the rise of neo-Nazi activities across the country, Lewis’ story offers a guide to what happens when hate groups move from the margins into the mainstream of American society and when an American government seems complacent or, as some would argue, complicit. Lewis understood that democracy requires constant vigilance against all enemies, internal and external. He and his network of spies showed that when a government fails to stem the rise of extremists bent on violence, it is up to every citizen to protect the lives of every American, no matter their race or religion. Only in a “unified America,” he said after the war, could the nation and its citizens achieve the true “realization of the American democratic ideal.”

Adaptado de Hitler in Los Angeles: How Jews Foiled Nazi Plots Against Hollywood and America. Copyright © Steven J. Ross, 2017. Published by Bloomsbury USA. Order here.

This story first appeared in the Sept. 20 issue of The Hollywood Reporter magazine. To receive the magazine, click here to subscribe.


This Is How the Allies Attempted to Kill Hitler

Ponto chave: They did try to do him in and there were Germans too who hated Hitler. However, he would not die until by his own hand at the end of the war.

Adolf Hitler believed in Vorsehung (providence). The German leader felt that if anything was going to happen to him, such as assassination, there was nothing he could do about it. He had been selected by fate to achieve something great he would not die, either by accident or assassination, until he had fulfilled that God-given mission.Time and time again in the past, providence, not planning, had taken care of him. In 1933, for instance, just before he became master of the Third Reich, he was involved in a terrible car crash with a truck. He emerged from the wreckage stating that he could not die yet—his mission had not yet been achieved.

This first appeared earlier in 2020 and is being reposted due to reader interest.

It was the same with assassination attempts. Hitler explained that he had many enemies and expected disgruntled Germans and others to try to kill him. But they would never succeed, especially if they came from the German working class. He used to state to his staff quite categorically, “Mil tut kein deutscher Arbeiter was” (“No German worker will ever do anything to me.”). Once, when he was advised by worried police to use the back entrance to a noisy and angry meeting of workers, Hitler snorted, “I am not going through any back door to meet my workers!”

As for those aristocratic Monokelfritzen (Monocle Fritzes, those high-born, monocled aristocrats Hitler had hated with a passion ever since the Great War), both civilian and military, whom he knew from his intelligence sources had been trying to eradicate him in these last years of the 1930s, he was confident that this personal providence would save him. And in truth, until the very end, providence did protect Hitler from all the attempts on his life, including the generals’ plot to kill him in July 1944.

Naturally, ever since Hitler’s election as chancellor in 1933, his security guards had taken secret precautions to protect him. Like some medieval potentate, all the Führer’s food was checked daily before it was served to him. Each day, his personal doctor had to report that the Führer’s food supplies were free of poison. Party Secretary Martin Bormann ran daily checks on the water at any place where the Führer might stay to ascertain whether it might contain any toxic substances.

Later, when Bormann, in his usual fawning manner, started to grow “bio-vegetables” in his Berchtesgaden gardens for the Führer’s consumption, Hitler’s staff would not allow the produce to appear on the master’s vegetarian menu. Once, just before the war, a bouquet of roses was thrown into the Führer’s open Mercedes. One of his SS adjutants picked it up and a day later started to show the symptoms of poisoning. The roses were examined and found to be impregnated with a poison that could be absorbed through the skin. Thereafter, the order was given out secretly that no “admirer” should be allowed to throw flowers into Hitler’s car. In addition, from then on, adjutants would wear gloves.

On another occasion, Hitler, who loved dogs (some said more than human beings), was given a puppy by a supposed admirer. It turned out that the cuddly little dog had been deliberately infected with rabies. Fortunately for Hitler, and not so fortunately for the rest of humanity, the puppy bit a servant before it bit him. It seemed that Hitler’s vaunted providence had taken care of him yet again.

Thereafter, plan after plan was drawn up to kill Hitler by his German and Anglo-American enemies. All failed. Although back in 1939, the British Foreign Secretary, Lord Halifax, had stated, “We have not reached the stage in our diplomacy when we have to use assassination as a substitute for diplomacy.” Prime Minister Winston Churchill decided in April 1945, however, that Hitler must die—by assassination! He gave the task to his most ruthless and anti-German commander, Sir Arthur “Bomber” Harris, the head of Royal Air Force Bomber Command, whose aircrews often called him bitterly “Butcher” Harris.

Back in the summer of 1943, Harris had sworn that Berlin would be “hammered until the heart of Nazi Germany would cease to exist.” Hard man that he was, Harris had once been stopped by a young policeman and told if he continued to speed in his big American car, he would kill someone. Coldly, “Bomber” had replied, “Young man, I kill hundreds every night.” He now ordered that Hitler should be dealt with at last in his own home. The Führer had escaped, so Allied intelligence reasoned, from his ruined capital Berlin. So where could he be? The answer was obvious. “Wolf,” the alias Hitler had used before he achieved power in 1933, had returned to his mountain lair.

In that last week of April 1945, Allied intelligence felt there were only two possible places where Hitler might now be holed up since his East Prussian headquarters had been overrun by the Red Army. Either he was in Berlin, or at his Eagle’s Nest in the Bavarian Alps above the township of Berchtesgaden. Reports coming from Switzerland and relayed to Washington and London by Allen Dulles of the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) stated that the Germans were building up a kind of last-ditch mountain fortress in the Austrian-German Alps, so Allied intelligence was inclined to think that Hitler had already headed for Berchtesgaden where he could lead the Nazis’ fight to the finish. The bulk of the Reichsbank’s gold bullion had already been sent to the area to disappear in perhaps the biggest robbery in history.

Luftwaffe chief Hermann Göring had gone in the same direction, followed by Foreign Minister Joachim von Ribbentrop, who had taken up residence in his stolen Austrian castle. More importantly, SS General Sepp Dietrich’s beaten 6th SS Panzer Army was retreating from Hungary, followed by the Red Army, heading for Austria and the same general area. Thus, the Allied planners decided that if they were finally going to assassinate Hitler, they would find him in his mountain home—built for him over the last decade by Bormann. Prominent Nazis, the Prominenz, just like Mafia chieftains, had erected their own homes in Berchtesgaden to be close to Hitler.

Once it had simply been a rural beauty spot, with a couple of modest hotels surrounded by small hill farms that had been in the same hands for centuries. Bormann changed all that. He bribed, threatened, and blackmailed the Erbbaueren (the hereditary farmers, as they were called) to abandon their farms. He sold their land at premium rates to fellow Nazis and then, as war loomed, erected a military complex to protect the Führer whenever he was in residence on the mountain among the “Mountain People,” as the Nazis called themselves. After he completed his 50th birthday present for the Führer, the Eagle’s Nest, which Hitler visited only five times and which cost 30 million marks to construct, Bormann turned his attention to making the whole mountain complex as secure as possible, both from the land and the air.

Bormann, the “Brown Eminence” as he was known, the secretive party secretary, who in reality wielded more power on the German home front than Hitler himself, declared the whole mountain sperrgebiet (off limits). A battalion of the Waffen SS was stationed there permanently. Together with mountain troops from nearby Bad Reichenhall, the SS patrolled the boundaries of this prohibited area 24 hours a day, something the British planners of Operation Foxley, a land attack planned by the British in February 1945, had not reckoned with.

Then, Bormann turned his attention to the threat of an air attack. Great air raid shelters were dug, not only for the Führer and the Prominenz, but also for the guards, servants, and foreign workers—there was even a cinema, which could hold 8,000 people. Chemical companies were brought in and stationed at strategic points on the mountain. As soon as the first warning of an enemy air attack was given, they could produce a smoke screen, which, in theory, could cover the key parts of the area in a matter of minutes. Finally, there were the fighter bases such as Furstenfeldbruck in the Munich area where planes could be scrambled to ward off any aerial attack from the west or indeed over the Alps from the newer Allied air bases in Italy.

Whether it was because of Bormann’s precautions, the problem of flying over the Alps in a heavy, bomb-laden aircraft, or Allied scruples about bombing an enemy politician’s home, the mountain had not been seriously troubled by air raids until now. Bomber Harris was determined to end all that. If anyone could, Harris swore, he would blast Berchtesgaden off the map.


Assista o vídeo: Fotógrafo documenta militares crossdressers na Segunda Guerra


Comentários:

  1. Deiphobus

    Sua frase é linda

  2. Dinsmore

    Acho que isso já foi discutido

  3. Tulkree

    Não chega perto de mim. As variantes ainda podem existir?

  4. Filmore

    Mensagem muito útil

  5. Irenbend

    aha obrigada!

  6. Fynn

    Peço desculpas por interferir ... posso encontrar meu caminho em torno dessa pergunta. Entre vamos discutir.



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